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Notes
The Spousal Share in Intestate Succession:
Stepparents are Getting Shortchanged
INTRODUCTION
American families have changed dramatically in the last
twenty-five years.1 The tremendous increase in the divorce
rate has led to a growing number of remarriages.2 Stepfamilies,
formed when a child's parent marries an individual who is not
the child's other biological parent,3 have become common
households.4 The legal system, however, has not broadened its
1. Fine, Perceptions of Stepparents: Variation in Stereotypes as a Func-
tion of Current Family Structure, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 537, 537 (1986); see
also Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of
Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 353
(1988) (describing the wide variety of modern communal living arrangements).
2. Fine, supra note 1, at 537 (citing Glick, Marriage, Divorce, and Living
Arrangements: Prospective Changes, 5 J. FAM. ISSUES 7, 10 (1984) [hereinafter
Glick, Prospective Changes]). Remarried couples represent 21.3% of all mar-
ried couples in the U.S. and stepfamilies represent 8.3% of all married couples.
Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief Demo-
graphic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 25 (1989) [hereinafter Glick, Demographics].
A remarried family is "a husband and wife maintaining a household with or
without children in the home and with one or both spouses in their second or
subsequent marriage." Id, at 24. A stepfamily is "a remarried family with a
child under 18 years of age who is the biological child of one of the parents and
was born before the remarriage occurred." Id.
3. This Note uses the term "biological parent" to include both a biologi-
cal parent and an adoptive parent. Similarly, the term "biological child" in-
cludes both a biological child and an adopted child.
4. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills,
22 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 917, 917 (1989). There were an estimated 11.0 million
remarried families and 4.3 million stepfamilies in the U.S. in 1987. Glick,
Demographics, supra note 2, at 25. By the year 2000, stepfamilies may out-
number all other kinds of American families. E. VISHER & J. VISHER, OLD
LOYALTIES, NEW TIES: THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES WITH STEPFAMILIES ix (1988)
(citing Glick, Prospective Changes, supra note 2, at 23-24; Glick & Lin, Recent
Changes in Divorce and Remarriage, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737, 744-45
(1986)). Therefore, now and for the foreseeable future, stepfamily issues will
concern researchers, clinicians, and policymakers. Giles-Sims & Crosbie-Bur-
nett, Stepfamily Research. Implications for Policy, Clinical Interventions,
and Further Research, 38 FAM. REL. 19, 19 (1989).
A study based on the 1981 National Health Interview Survey found that
82% of stepparents were stepfathers and 18% were stepmothers. Glick,
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concept of family to include stepfamilies.5 Legal rights and ob-
ligations, premised on the traditional first-married family
model, generally are not extended to stepfamily members.6
The spousal share provision in the Uniform Probate Code's
(U.P.C.)7 intestate succession statutes illustrates the legal sys-
tem's differential treatment of stepfamilies. Section 2-102 of
the U.P.C. allows a husband or wife to inherit part of the de-
ceased spouse's intestate estate.9 The Code gives the surviving
Demographics, supra note 2, at 26. This discrepancy results from family courts
awarding child custody to mothers in approximately 90% of divorce decrees.
Ihinger-Tallman, Research on Stepfamilies, 14 ANN. REV. Soc. 25, 28 (1988)
(citing L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 222 (1985)).
5. See Lovas, supra note 1, at 353 (stating that inheritance statutes gener-
ally are patterned after the traditional family, although traditional families
constitute less than 50% of American households). Social norms for families
reflect a cultural lag. The dominant model for expectations is the first-mar-
ried family. In comparison to this idealized model, stepfamilies appear defi-
cient. Concepts of family relationships need to be broadened to encompass the
great diversity of families common in the United States today. Giles-Sims &
Crosbie-Burnett, supra note 4, at 20.
6. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 918; see infra notes 51 & 88-89 (discussing
legal treatment of stepfamily members).
7. The U.P.C. was promulgated by the United Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1969, and subsequently approved by the
American Bar Association. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About
Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United
States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 323. Part 1 of Article II of the U.P.C.
concerns intestate succession. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 introductory
comment (1983). This Note refers to the original U.P.C. of 1969 as the current
Code.
Fifteen states have officially adopted the U.P.C. in its entirety. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1989). One state has adopted the U.P.C. in part.
See id. Twenty-two states, however, follow the U.P.C.'s spousal share distribu-
tion scheme. See infra note 27. Thus, several states follow the U.P.C. ap-
proach without officially adopting the Code.
8. Intestate succession statutes provide a property distribution scheme
for individuals who die without leaving a will. Mulder, Intestate Succession
Under the Uniform Probate Code, 3 PROSPECTUS 301, 301 (1970). Intestacy
laws also operate when a will fails to dispose of all the probate assets. Fellows,
Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 322 n.5. In partial intestacy situations, intestate
succession statutes apply only to the property not disposed of by will. Id,
In a study of public attitudes about property distribution at death, a group
of researchers found that approximately 45% of respondents had a will. Id. at
337. This proportion of living persons with wills was high in comparison with
results obtained in prior studies. Id. at 337 n.65.
9. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (1983). Section 2-102 provides:
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is:
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire
intestate estate;
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a
parent or parents, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of
the intestate estate;
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spouse a greater share in preference to the decedent's children
only if the surviving spouse is the biological parent of the chil-
dren.1 0 The spousal share decreases if the spouse is a steppar-
ent of surviving children.'
A proposed revision to the U.P.C.,12 to take effect in 1990,
makes important changes in the surviving spouse's share of the
estate.' 3 The revision, however, suffers from two flaws.' 4 First,
the revised U.P.C. continues to limit the spousal share when
the surviving spouse is a stepparent of surviving children. 15
Second, the revision introduces more discrimination against
stepfamilies by decreasing the spousal share when both a
stepchild and a biological child survive the decedent.16 The
U.P.C.'s peremptory and unfair treatment of stepfamilies con-
travenes the goal of structuring intestate succession laws to re-
flect the decedent's dispository wishes. 17 Further reforms are
necessary to make the Code an accurate reflection of the needs
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving
spouse also, the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the in-
testate estate;
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of
the surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
The Code defines "issue" of a person to mean "all his lineal descendants
of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each generation
being determined by the definitions of child and parent contained in the
Code." Id § 1-201(21). A "child" includes any individual entitled to inherit
from a parent, but excludes a stepchild. Id- § 1-201(3). A "parent" includes
any person entitled to inherit as a parent, but excludes a stepparent. Id § 1-
201(28).
10. See id. § 2-102(3) (providing that "if there are surviving issue all of
whom are issue of the surviving spouse also, [the spousal share is] the first
[$50,000, plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate").
11. See id § 2-102(4) (providing that "if there are surviving issue one or
more of whom are not issue of the surviving spouse, [the spousal share is] one-
half of the intestate estate").
12. The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (JEB-UPC)
and a special Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) are revising Article II of the 1969
Code. The Article II revisions cited in this Note are draft provisions of the
JEB-UPC. The revisions are in an advanced stage, but subject to change
before final approval by the NCCUSL. W. Waggoner, R. Wellman, G. Alexan-
der, M. Fellows & R. Stein, Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests (interim 5th ed.
1989) [hereinafter W. Waggoner, Wills] prefatory note (unpublished manu-
script available from Minnesota Law Review).
13. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110-32 (discussing shortcomings of
the revision).
15. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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and desires of remarried families.18
This Note examines the treatment of stepfamilies under
the spousal share provision of the U.P.C. intestacy statute. Part
I examines current intestacy law as well as social policies and
research that can provide guidance in developing intestate suc-
cession laws. Part II details the proposed revision of the U.P.C.
spousal share provision. Part III discusses the extent to which
the proposed U.P.C. reflects social policies and research find-
ings that indicate that stepfamily members often develop im-
portant bonds and may desire to benefit one another in
testamentary dispositions. Part IV proposes a model revision
that better meets the goals of intestacy law by providing a don-
ative plan that recognizes stepfamily relationships. The Note
concludes that, although the revised U.P.C. makes significant
improvements in the spousal share of the intestate estate, fur-
ther changes are necessary to transform the U.P.C. into a stat-
ute that effectively meets the needs of stepfamilies. The U.P.C.
should be revised to treat a surviving spouse who is a steppar-
ent the same as a biological parent in situations in which a rela-
tionship between stepfamily members likely developed.
I. THE SPOUSAL SHARE IN INTESTACY STATUTES
A. CURRENT INTESTACY LAW: THE U.P.C. AND STATE
INTESTACY SCHEMES
The U.P.C. adopts the traditional view that intestacy provi-
sions should reflect the dispository wishes of persons who die
without wills.19 The U.P.C. gives the surviving spouse the en-
18. See Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 39 (1984) (recognizing that the law must
create new rules as family life becomes more variable and the traditional first-
married family model erodes).
By continuing to reduce the spousal share in stepfamily situations, the
U.P.C. influences many states to treat stepfamilies differently. Most statutes
that include a special provision for a spouse who is the stepparent of surviving
children follow the U.P.C.'s spousal distribution scheme. See infra notes 27,
29. Only nine statutes that reduce the spousal share in stepfamily situations
fail to adopt a fixed-share-plus-a-fraction approach. See id. The U.P.C. thus
has been influential in establishing intestacy laws that make special provisions
for remarriage cases.
19. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 introductory comment (1983). The
drafters relied on prevailing patterns in will studies to determine the distribu-
tive preferences of average persons. Id. An alternative view is that intestacy
laws should fulfill certain societal goals. According to some commentators,
"[t]here are four identifiable community aims: (1) to protect the financially
dependent family; (2) to avoid complicating property titles and excessive sub-
division of property; (3) to promote and encourage the nuclear family; and (4)
[Vol. 74:631
1990] INTESTATE SUCCESSION
tire intestate estate if there is no surviving child or parent of
the decedent.20 When a parent survives the decedent and there
are no surviving issue, the U.P.C. employs a fixed-share-plus-a-
fraction approach.21 Under this approach, the surviving spouse
receives the first $50,000 of the estate, plus one-half of the re-
mainder.2 2 If there are surviving issue, all of whom are issue of
the surviving spouse, the spouse again takes the first $50,000
and one-half of the balance.23 The U.P.C. approach thus en-
sures that a surviving spouse receives all of a moderate estate
of $50,000 or less, and the greater part of larger estates. 24 If one
or more of the surviving children are not the surviving spouse's
issue, however, the spouse receives only one-half of the intes-
tate estate.25 Thus, in many stepfamily situations, the surviving
spouse receives only a fraction of the decedent's estate, without
receiving an initial fixed share.
When promulgated in 1969, the U.P.C. gave the surviving
spouse a greater share of the estate than most of the then-ex-
to encourage the accumulation of property by individuals." Fellows, Simon &
Rau, supra note 7, at 324 (footnotes omitted). Little conflict actually may exist
between a property owner's preferences and societal interests. Fellows, Con-
cealing Legislative Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The Advancements
Doctrine and the Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674 n.8 (1984).
20. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1) (1983), quoted at supra note 9. Collater-
als and ancestors only share in the estate when the decedent leaves no surviv-
ing spouse, issue, or parents. See id. § 2-103.
The U.P.C. provides an alternative provision for community property
states. Id. § 2-102A. As to separate property, the share of the surviving spouse
is the same as the share of the spouse under § 2-102. Id § 2-102A(1). The
spouse receives the decedent's one-half share of community property. Id. § 2-
102A(2).
21. See id. § 2-102(2) (1983), quoted at supra note 9.
22. Id. The parents share equally in the portion of the estate not passing
to the surviving spouse. Id § 2-103.
23. Id § 2-102(3), quoted at supra note 9. The decedent's issue share
equally in the portion of the estate not passing to the surviving spouse if they
are of the same degree of kinship to the decedent. Id. § 2-103(1). If the issue
are of unequal degree, those of more remote degree take by representation.
Id.
24. The U.P.C. fixed-share-plus-a-fraction approach is premised on the as-
sumption that a wealthier decedent is more likely to want to distribute part of
the estate to blood relatives. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 352.
25. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4) (1983), quoted at supra note 9. Adopted
children.cease to be children of biological parents and are treated as children
of the adopting parents for inheritance purposes. 1d. art. II, pt. 1 introductory
comment. The decedent's issue share equally in the portion of the estate not
passing to the surviving spouse if they are of the same degree of kinship to the
decedent. Id § 2-103(1). If they are of unequal degree, those of more remote
degree take by representation. Id.
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isting state intestacy schemes. 2 6 The fixed-share-plus-a-fraction
approach now has become the most common intestacy plan,
although a majority of states do not follow it.27 Many states
still retain the traditional approach of limiting the surviving
spouse's share to one-third or one-half of the estate when issue
survive the decedent.28 Many state legislatures reduce the
26. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 general comment (1969).
27. Twenty-two states have adopted a fixed-share-plus-a-fraction ap-
proach. The amount of the fixed share and the fractional share in the remain-
der varies by state. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-41(2), (3) (1982); ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.11.010(2), (3) (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-102(b) (1987) (distribution
applies only between the spouse and issue; the parents do not share in the es-
tate); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-273a(b)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1989); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 502(2), (3) (1987) (distribution applies only to personal
property; the surviving spouse takes a life estate in all real estate); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 732.102(1)(b) (West 1976) (distribution applies only between the spouse
and issue; the parents do not share in the estate); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-102(a)(2),
(3) (1979) (distribution applies only to separate property; the spouse receives
the decedent's share of community property); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A,
§ 2-102(2), (3) (1981); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-102(c), (d) (Supp.
1989) (distribution applies only if the surviving child is an adult; if the child is
a minor, the spouse receive a one-half share in the estate); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 190, § 1(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (distribution applies only between the
spouse and parents; when issue survive, the spouse receives a one-half share in
the estate); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 700.105(b), (c) (West 1980); MINN. STAT.
§ 524.2-102(2) (1988) (distribution applies only between the spouse and issue;
the parents do not share in the estate); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.010(1)(b), (c)
(1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302(2), (3) (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 561:1(I)(b), (c) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-3(b), (c) (West 1983); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.1(a)(1)-(4) (McKinney 1981) (the balance to the
spouse increases when only one child survives the decedent); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 29-14(a)-(c) (1989) (the balance to the spouse increases when only one child
survives the decedent); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02 (2-102)(2), (3) (1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(B), (C) (Anderson 1988) (distribution applies
only between the spouse and issue; the parents do not share in the estate; the
balance to the spouse increases if only one child survives the decedent); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(2), (3) (Purdon Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 29-1-6 (1984) (distribution applies only between the spouse and parents;
when issue survive, the spouse receives a one-third share of the estate).
28. Statutes of eight states and the District of Columbia provide that the
spouse receives one-third of the estate and the children share in the balance.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c)(3) (West Supp. 1990) (the share to the surviv-
ing spouse increases to one-half when the decedent leaves only one child; dis-
tribution applies only to separate property; the spouse receives the decedent's
share of community property); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-303 (1989); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 123.250, 134.040 (1987) (the share to the surviving spouse increases to
one-half when the decedent leaves only one child; distribution applies only to
separate property; the spouse receives the decedent's share of community
property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 213(A) (West Supp. 1990) (the share to
the surviving spouse increases to one-half when only one child survives the de-
cedent); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 29-1-5 (1984) (the share to the surviving
spouse increases to one-half when only one child survives the decedent); TENN.
[Vol. 74:631
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spousal share when the surviving spouse is not the biological
parent of one or more of the decedent's surviving children.29
Most statutes that make a special provision for a surviving step-
parent follow the U.P.C. fixed-share-plus-a-fraction approach.30
When there are no surviving issue but the decedent is sur-
vived by a parent, many states allow the parent to share in the
estate with the spouse. Although the exact division varies
widely, the U.P.C. fixed-share-plus-a-fraction approach is the
most common method of division in this situation.3 1 Some
CODE ANN. § 31-2-104(a)(2) (1984) (the surviving spouse receives either one-
third or a child's share, whichever is greater); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 38(b)(1) (Vernon 1980) (distribution applies only to personal property; the
surviving spouse takes a life estate in one-third of the real estate); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §§ 401, 461, 474 (1974) (the share to the surviving spouse increases
to one-half when only one child survives the decedent); W. VA. CODE §§ 42-2-1,
43-1-1 (1982).
Nine state statutes provide that the spouse receives one-half of the estate
with the children sharing in the remainder. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 560:2-
102(2) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 2-1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-1(b)(1) (Burns 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-504, -505
(1983); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 190, § 1(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWs §§ 33-1-10, -25-2 (1984) (distribution applies only to personal property;
the surviving spouse receives a life estate in all real estate); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-102(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.015(1)(b)
(1987) (distribution applies only to separate property; the spouse receives the
decedent's share of community property); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-101(a)(i) (Supp.
1989).
29. Twenty-six states reduce the share to a surviving spouse who is not
the biological or adoptive parent of the decedent's children. See ALA. CODE
§ 43-8-41(4) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.010(4) (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-2102(2) (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-102(c) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-273a(b)(4) (West Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 502(4) (1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.102(c) (West 1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-102(a)(4) (1979)
(distribution applies only to separate property; the surviving spouse receives
the decedent's share of community property); INI. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-1(c)
(Burns 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.212 (West Supp. 1989); LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 890 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102(4)
(1981); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 700.105(d) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-
102(3) (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.010(1)(d) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-
202(2) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2302(4) (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 561:1(I)(d) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-3(d) (West 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-04-02 (2-102)(4) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(B), (C) (Ander-
son 1988) (balance to the spouse increases if only one child survives); OR. REV.
STAT. § 112.025(2) (Supp. I 1988); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(4) (Purdon
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-102 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-
1, -11, -19 (1987); Wis. STAT. § 852.01 (1987-1988).
30. See supra notes 27, 29.
31. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have adopted statutes
that grant the surviving spouse a fixed dollar amount with the spouse and par-
ents sharing in the remainder. See supra note 27. Statutes of five states and
the District of Columbia provide that the spouse receives one-half of the estate
IMINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
states, however, require the spouse to split the estate assets in
half with the parents.32 The U.P.C. drafters considered the
Code's approach more responsive to contemporary problems
and the desires of average persons.33
B. PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL POLICIES CONCERNING
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION AT DEATH
Intestate succession laws are designed to provide an estate
plan that approximates the property distribution a decedent
would have made in a will.34 This objective makes intestacy a
unique area in which quantitative research can be valuable in
evaluating a legislative scheme.3 5 Data can be used to infer the
testamentary intent of persons who die without wills. Several
scholars have tried to find commonly used patterns of property
disposition by conducting studies of wills filed for probate.36
Other commentators have conducted surveys of living persons
to determine how they wish to dispose of their property at
death.3 7 In 1978, a group of researchers published a compre-
and the parents take the remaining one-half. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6401(c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-304 (1989); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-102(2) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 123.250, 134.050(1) (1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 213(A) (West Supp. 1990); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 38(B)(2) (Vernon 1980) (distribution applies only to real estate; the surviving
spouse takes all the decedent's personal property).
Twenty states do not allow the decedent's parents to share in the estate
with the surviving spouse. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102(1) (1975);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-102(1)(a) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.102(1)(a)
(West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-2(1) (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
para. 2-1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.211 (West Supp.
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-504 (1983); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-102(1) (1988);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-7 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-202(1) (1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 45-2-102(A)(1) (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(D) (An-
derson 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.035 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-102(1)
(Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104(1)(a) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-102 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-1, -11 (1987); W. VA. CODE
§§ 42-1-1(b), -2-1 (1982); Wis. STAT. § 852.01(1)(a)(1) (1987-1988); WYO. STAT.
§ 2-4-101(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989).
32. See supra note 31.
33. Mulder, supra note 8, at 304.
34. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission
at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 241 (1963).
35. Id.
36. See generally M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND IN-
HERITANCE 83-120 (1970) [hereinafter M. SUSSMAN] (analyzing distribution pat-
terns of wills filed for probate); Dunham, supra note 34, at 251-55 (same);
Schneider, A Kentucky Study of Will Provisions: Implications for Intestate
Succession Law, 13 N. Ky. L. REV. 409, 416-37 (1986) (same).
37. See generally Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 341-84 (analyz-
ing distribution patterns revealed from surveys of living persons); Fellows, Si-
[Vol. 74:631
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hensive survey of popular attitudes about property distribution
at death.38 The survey confirmed the results of earlier studies,
showing that a majority of people want the surviving spouse to
take the entire estate in preference to both the decedent's issue
and parents.39
1. Distributing Property Between the Spouse and the
Decedent's Parents and Issue
The 1978 study verified that 100 percent distribution of the
estate to the spouse is the most often desired allocation as be-
tween the decedent's spouse and parents.40 Because removing
wealth from the decedent's blood relatives is perceived as un-
fair, however, legislators hesitate to exclude a surviving parent
and leave the entire estate to the surviving spouse.4 1 Such a
distribution could disinherit parents who depended financially
on the decedent.42 Moreover, if the marriage was of a short du-
ration, the surviving spouse may not have emerged as the pri-
mary kin obligation or as the primary object of the decedent's
affection. 43
mon, Snapp & Snapp, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate
Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV. 717, 723-43 [hereinafter Illinois Study] (same); Com-
ment, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does It Conform to Popular Expec-
tations?, 12 COLUmi. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 253, 266-78 (1976) (same); Comment, A
Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the
Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IowA L. REV. 1041, 1078-1119 (1978)
[hereinafter Comment, Iowa Study] (same).
38. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7. The authors conducted a tele-
phone survey of 750 persons living in Alabama, California, Massachusetts,
Ohio, and Texas. Id at 321. They questioned respondents to determine atti-
tudes toward testamentary freedom, the frequency of testacy, knowledge of in-
testacy law, and dispositive preferences. Id.
39. Id. The percentage of respondents in the survey who indicated an in-
tention to leave the entire estate to the spouse, however, was less than the per-
centage of decedent testators in prior will studies who devised the entire estate
to the spouse. See id. at 350 n.110, 351 & n.111, 356 n.127, 359 & n.133 (compar-
ing results of the survey with results from earlier will studies). Thus, the sur-
vey indicated that living persons are less willing than decedent testators to
distribute the entire estate to the surviving spouse. Id. at 360. The authors at-
tributed this discrepancy to the intercession of attorneys, who often advise
their clients that distribution to the spouse will best achieve the testators'
goals. Id.
40. See id. at 350 n.110, 351 n.111 (summarizing results of earlier studies).
41. Illinois Study, supra note 37, at 727. One concern is that leaving the
entire estate to the spouse may permanently remove wealth from the dece-
dent's "family of orientation." Id. The family of orientation is "the family into
which the decedent is born." Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 340 n.75.
42. Illinois Study, supra note 37, at 727.
43. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 348. Similarly, in remarriage
situations, the second spouse may not have displaced the parents as the pri-
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The 1978 study also verified that distribution of the entire
estate to the spouse is the desired allocation as between the de-
cedent's children and the surviving spouse who is the biological
parent of the children.44 Again, legislators have been reluctant
to follow this preference. 45 The primary concern is that if the
surviving spouse receives the entire estate, the spouse might
disinherit the children or remarry and treat the decedent's chil-
dren unfairly.46 Furthermore, some commentators argue that
the surviving children should receive a share of the decedent's
estate without waiting for the surviving parent to die.47 There
is little evidence, however, indicating that surviving spouses dis-
inherit their children.48 The primary concern, therefore, is bal-
ancing the competing interests of the spouse and the children
during the surviving spouse's lifetime.49
2. Distributing Property Between Spouse and Issue When the
Spouse Is the Stepparent of Surviving Children
When a husband or wife dies during a remarriage and
leaves children from an earlier marriage and the spouse of a
current marriage, the appropriate distribution is less certain.50
Conflicting interests between the surviving spouse and children
are more apparent because there is some doubt that the surviv-
ing stepparent will provide for the decedent's children.51 Com-
mary object of the decedent's affection. Id. Fairness may require a special
provision in the intestate succession statute for this situation. Id. at 351 n.112.
44. Id. at 356 n.127, 359 n.133 (summarizing results of earlier studies).
45. See Illinois Study, supra note 37, at 728.
46. Comment, Iowa Study, supra note 37, at 1084.
47. Illinois Study, supra note 37, at 731.
48. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 355. The will studies provide
no data suggesting that surviving spouses disinherit their children. Id.
49. Id. at 355. There may be a risk of poor financial management of the
decedent's estate by the surviving spouse, but it is difficult to assess and proba-
bly does not outweigh the risk of leaving the spouse without adequate finan-
cial security. Id.
50. Id. at 364.
51. Illinois Study, supra note 37, at 732. A stepparent generally has no
statutory obligation to support a stepchild upon termination of the remarriage.
Fine, A Social Science Perspective on Stepfamily Law: Suggestions for Legal
Reform, 38 FAm. REL. 53, 54 (1989). Only North Dakota requires a support ob-
ligation to continue after the remarriage ends, and only if the child continues
to live with the stepparent. Id. The common law, however, may impose sup-
port obligations on a stepparent who acts "in loco parentis." Under this doc-
trine, a stepparent who intentionally assumes parental obligations, such as
actively participating in child-rearing decisions and attending a child's aca-
demic and recreational functions, may be treated as a biological parent. Id. at
54-55; see also Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 770 (D.C. 1968) (stating that step-
parent acting "in loco parentis" is required to support stepchild), appeal de-
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paratively little data exists regarding multiple marriage cases
because the possible situations are so varied.52 A second mar-
riage late in life when the children are adults creates different
problems than a second marriage early in life in which the de-
cedent leaves minor children.5 3 The appropriate distribution
also will vary depending on whether the decedent's issue live in
the decedent's household or with the ex-spouse.54 The situation
becomes even more complex if the surviving spouse has chil-
dren from an earlier marriage or if there are children from the
nied per curiam, 418 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Stepparents, however, may
terminate "in loco parentis" status at any time by ceasing to act "in loco paren-
tis." Note, Stepfamily Law: Review and Proposals For Change, 18 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 701, 708 (1984). Thus, because a stepparent may terminate a support
obligation at will, the doctrine has little value in imposing future obligations.
Fine, supra, at 55. A few courts have invoked estoppel theory to abrogate the
rule that a person acting "in loco parentis" may terminate that status at any
time, but only in unusual circumstances. See Note, supra, at 710. See also
Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 159, 478 A.2d 351, 353 (1984) (stating that steppar-
ent acting "in loco parentis" was estopped from denying post-divorce support
obligations to stepchildren); Gustin v. Gustin, 108 Ohio App. 171, 174, 161
N.E.2d 68, 70 (1958) (stating that stepfather acting "in loco parentis" was re-
quired to support stepchild following dissolution of remarriage).
52. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 364-65. The findings of the
studies are conflicting. Some surveys indicate that when a spouse and a minor
child of an earlier marriage each survive the decedent, the majority of persons
still prefer that the surviving spouse inherit the entire estate. See Illinois
Study, supra note 37, at 729 (finding that when a spouse and a minor child of
an earlier marriage residing with the surviving spouse each survive the dece-
dent, 50.3% of respondents wanted the surviving spouse to inherit the entire
estate; when the surviving child lived with the decedent's former spouse,
56.7% of respondents wanted the surviving stepparent to receive all of the es-
tate); cf. M. SUSSMAN, supra note 36, at 91 (finding that of 28 remarried dece-
dents, 57% devised all of their property to their spouses or legatees of the last
marriage).
In another study, however, only 29% of respondents indicated that they
would allocate the entire estate to the spouse when the decedent's only survi-
vors were the spouse and two adult children, one from the present marriage
and one from a previous marriage. Comment, Iowa Study, supra note 37, at
1094-95. Instead, the respondents indicated that they would allocate an aver-
age share of 58% of the estate to the surviving spouse. Id.
In one other survey, respondents were asked hypothetically to distribute
property between a spouse and a minor child from a previous marriage who
resides with the former spouse. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 366.
Twenty-three percent of respondents would leave the spouse the entire estate
and an additional 28.9% would leave the spouse between 51% and 99% of the
estate. Id
53. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 365. When the second mar-
riage occurs early in life and the children are young, an opportunity exists for
the stepparent and the minor child to develop a parent-child relationship. Id.
The parent-child relationship also is more likely to form when the minor child
lives in the remarriage household. Id.
54. Id.
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current marriage.
55
In multiple marriage situations, legislators must decide
whether to treat the stepparent in the same manner as a sur-
viving spouse who is the biological parent of the decedent's
children.56 The primary reason for not treating the spouses
alike is the fear that the stepparent will not pass the estate as-
sets on to the stepchild.57 Legislators may suspect that the
stepparent will transfer the decedent's property to his or her
children or to a new spouse in a subsequent remarriage.58
C. STEPFAMILY RELATIONS
1. Societal Attitudes Toward Stepfamilies
Social scientists in the 1980s published a growing body of
research on stepfamily relationships.5 9 The findings demon-
strate a societal bias against stepfamilies. 60 Perceptions of
55. Id
56. Comment, Iowa Study, supra note 37, at 1092. Legislators usually do
not extend the legal rights and obligations of the biological parent-child rela-
tionship to stepfamily members. Fine, supra note 51, at 53; see also supra note
51 & infra notes 88-89 (discussing the legal status of stepfamily members). A
breakthrough, however, recently occurred in California. The California legis-
lature amended the California Probate Code to allow a stepchild to inherit
from a stepparent or foster parent when a parent-child relationship exists be-
tween the stepfamily members. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408(b) (West Supp. 1990).
A parent-child relationship is established if "the relationship began during the
person's minority and continued throughout the parties' joint lifetimes" and if
"it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the foster parent or
stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier." id
The California Probate Code also was amended recently to include
stepchildren in class gift designations when a parent-child relationship is es-
tablished. See id. § 6152(a), (b). This statute provides that a stepchild is in-
cluded in a class gift if a stepchild would be considered a "child" for purposes
of intestate succession (as established in § 6408). Id; see infra note 126 (defin-
ing class gift).
57. Schneider, supra note 36, at 421. When the surviving spouse is the bi-
ological parent of all the surviving children, the surviving spouse presumably
will leave his or her property to the decedent's children at some future point.
Comment, Iowa Study, supra note 37, at 1094. When the surviving spouse is
not the biological parent of the decedent's children, however, eventual passage
of estate assets to the intestate's children is less certain. Id.
58. Cf. Schneider, supra note 36, at 421 (suggesting that the testator may
suspect that the surviving spouse will divert the testator's property).
59. Ihinger-Tallman, supra note 4, at 26. Legal scholars occasionally ac-
knowledge that social science data can provide guidance in legal decisionmak-
ing, but this occurs infrequently in the stepfamily context. Fine, supra note
51, at 53. Professor Fine argues that social science research is an important
resource for persons attempting to reform stepfamily law. See id.
60. One group of researchers measured college students' perceptions of
adults and children in various family structures. Bryan, Coleman, Ganong &
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stepfamily members are less positive than those of traditional,
first-married families.6 1 People may interpret a stepparent's
behavior as negative simply because it fits the image of the
"wicked" stepmother or the "abusive" stepfather.6 2
Some scholars attribute negative societal attitudes toward
stepfamilies to folklore.63 These authors contend that the term
"step" evokes negative imagery found in fairy tales such as
"Cinderella," "Hansel and Gretel," and "Snow White." Such
negative perceptions create difficulty for stepfamily members.6 5
Stereotypes may contribute to stepfamily adjustment problems
in a society that views stepfamilies prejudicially.66 Negative
stereotyping also may lead stepfamily members to expect nega-
tive outcomes, thereby increasing chances of family
disharmony.6 7
Bryan, Person Perception: Family Structure as a Cue for Stereotyping, 48 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 169, 169 (1986) [hereinafter Stereotyping]. The researchers
found that students viewed stepfamily members less positively than members
of intact families. Id at 173.
Professor Fine obtained similar results in a study of college students.
Fine, supra note 1, at 537. In addition, he found that students from single-par-
ent and stepparent families generally had less stereotypical views of stepmoth-
ers than students from first-married homes. Id at 542. Professor Fine
concluded that experience with stepfamilies attenuates negative stereotypes of
stepmothers. I&
61. See supra note 60.
62. Stereotyping, supra note 60, at 169-73.
63. See E. VISHER & J. ViSHER, STEPFAMILIES: A GUIDE TO WORKING WITH
STEPPARENTS AND STEPCHILDREN 5-6 (1979) (discussing the effect of literature
on stepfamily members); E. WALD, THE REMARRIED FAMILY: CHALLENGE AND
PROMISE 54-62 (1981) (analyzing the step-theme in popular fairy tales); Schul-
man, Myths that Intrude on the Adaptation of the Stepfamily, 53 Soc.
CASEWORK 131, 131 (1972) (identifying the myth of the "bad stepmother" and
the countermyth of "instant love" that is expected between stepfamily
members).
64. Stereotyping, supra note 60, at 169-73.
65. Ihinger-Tallman, supra note 4, at 33. Negative stereotyping can influ-
ence social interactions and expectations and may exacerbate stepfamilies'
struggles to become complete, viable institutions. Id
66. Fine, supra note 1, at 538 (citing Stereotyping, supra note 60, at 169).
There is a widespread societal belief that "step is less." E. WALD, supra note
63, at 62. The term "step" has evolved to signify that anything of lesser value
is "like a stepchild." Mistreatment often is verbalized as "like a stepmother."
Similarly, the phrase "like a Cinderella" denotes mistreatment or neglect. Id.
Wald identifies a trend in popular culture that seeks to change the negative
orientation toward stepfamilies. Id at 63. An emergent belief is that "step is
not less; step is different." Id.
67. Fine, supra note 1, at 538 (citing E. WALD, supra note 63, at 52).
Stepfamilies struggle under the handicap of negative imagery. For example,
portrayals of stepmothers in folklore have evolved into a belief system about
stepfamilies. Stepchildren often are unable to differentiate a story from real-
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Studies indicate, however, that most stepfamilies have good
relations.68 Serious difficulties among family members concern
a minority of stepfamilies. 69 In many cases, stepfamily mem-
bers form important family ties.70 The relationship that devel-
ops between a stepparent and stepchild can be as close and
supportive as a relationship between a biological parent and his
or her child.71
2. Factors Influencing Stepfamily Relationships
Stepfamilies do face extra challenges not present in tradi-
tional, first-married families.72 Remarriage situations introduce
complexities into households and the quality of relationships
between stepfamily members varies according to several fac-
tors.73 These factors include the age of the child, the presence
of siblings, the degree of contact between the child and the
noncustodial parent, and the amount of interaction between the
stepparent and stepchild.74 Despite the complexity of multiple
ity, and fear that they, too, may be harmed by a mean stepmother. E. WALD,
supra note 63, at 61-62.
68. In a study of 88 stepfamilies, Professor Duberman found that 64% had
"excellent" stepparent-stepchild relationships, 18% had "good" relationships,
and only 18% reported "poor" relationships. L. DUBERMAN, THE REcONSTI-
TUTED FAMILY: A STUDY OF REMARRIED COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN 50
(1975). Ganong and Coleman write that most stepchildren reported liking
their stepparents and getting along well with them. Ganong & Coleman, The
Effects of Remarriage on Children: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 33
FAM. REL. 389, 400 (1984); see also Fuller, Facts and Fictions about Stepfami-
lies, EDUC. DIG., Oct. 1988, at 53 (stating that researchers generally agree that
most stepfamilies report being happy).
69. M. IHINGER-TALLMAN & K. PASLEY, REMARRIAGE 103 (Family Studies
Text Series Vol. 7, 1987).
70. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 917-18.
71. See Mahoney, supra note 18, at 54 (stating that stepfamily members
may develop emotional and financial expectations based on their
relationships).
72. Dukes, The Cinderella Myth: Negative Evaluations of Stepparents, 73
Soc. & Soc. RES. 67, 67 (1989). Dukes identifies five challenges unique to
stepfamilies: incomplete role definitions for family members; increased com-
plexity of role relationships within the stepfamily and resultant problems of
loyalty; guilt feelings concerning the loss of earlier family relationships; lack
of synchronization of roles; and immediate need to decide on the primacy of
the couple relationship versus the parent relationship. Id.; see also Ihinger-
Tallman, supra note 4, at 31-39 (describing difficulties in stepfamilies).
73. M. IHINGER-TALLMAN & K. PASLEY, supra note 69, at 48-50.
74. Fine, supra note 51, at 55-56. The sex of the child may affect the qual-
ity of the stepparent-stepchild relationship, but the findings are inconsistent.
Some studies show that girls have more difficulty than boys in developing a
relationship with stepparents. See, e.g., Clingempeel & Segal, Stepparent-
Stepchild Relationships and the Psychological Adjustment of Children in Step-
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marriage situations, these factors can help predict the success
of stepfamily relationships.75
An important factor in the development of stepparent-
stepchild relationships is the frequency of interaction between
the family members.76 Stepparents report having a closer rela-
tionship with stepchildren who live with them rather than with
stepchildren who live elsewhere.77 Interaction on a daily basis
creates more opportunity for family members to form positive
emotional bonds.78 Stepfamilies can form new attachments as
rules and routines become normal and habits and rituals
develop.7 9
mother and Stepfather Families, 57 CHILn DEV. 474, 482 (1986); Santrock, War-
shak, Lindbergh & Meadows, Children's and Parents' Observed Social
Behavior in Stepfather Families, 53 CHILD DEv. 472, 479 (1982); cf L.
DUBERMAN, supra note 68, at 57 (finding that the sex of the child is not a fac-
tor in stepparent-stepchild relationships); Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Effects of
Divorce on Parents and Children in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING
AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233, 258 (M. Lamb ed. 1982) (finding that divorced
mothers have more difficulty raising sons than raising daughters).
Researchers also disagree about the effect of a mutual child, a child born
during the remarriage, on stepfamily relations. Compare L. DuBERMAN, supra
note 68, at 61 (indicating that the presence of a mutual child fosters closeness
and integration between stepparents and stepchildren) with Santrock & Sit-
terle, Parent-Child Relationships in Stepmother Families, in REMARRIAGE AND
STEPPARENTING: CuRRENT RESEARCH AND THEORY 273, 293 (1987) (finding
that the birth of a mutual child has a negative impact on the parenting of a
stepchild).
75. Cf. Fine, supra note 51, at 57 (stating that an awareness of factors af-
fecting the stepparent-stepchild relationship can help courts assess the impor-
tance to the child of granting visitation rights to a stepparent).
76. L. DUBERMAN, supra note 68, at 106.
77. Ambert, Being a Stepparent. Live-in and Visiting Stepchildren, 48 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 795, 798 (1986). Stepmothers who lived with their stepchil-
dren also expressed a higher level of marital happiness than stepmothers who
had young stepchildren living outside the home. Id. at 797. Stepfathers' satis-
faction with married life, however, did not depend on a stepchild's residence.
Id.
78. M. IHINGER-TALLMAN & K. PASLEY, supra note 69, at 99. Daily inter-
action also may create more opportunity for conflict between stepfamily mem-
bers. Id.; see Hetherington, Family Relations Six Years after Divorce, in
REMARRIAGE & STEPPARENTING, CURRENT RESEARCH AND THEORY 195-97
(1987); see also Fischman, Stepdaughter Wars, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1988,
at 39 (quoting psychologist James Bray). Bray states that behavioral problems
disappear by two and one-half years into the remarriage and that there is no
difference in reported life stress between stepfamilies and non-divorced fami-
lies. Id.
79. M. IHINGER-TALLMAN & K. PASLEY, supra note 69, at 99. In the rou-
tine of daily contacts, stepparents and stepchildren develop a deeper relation-
ship as quarrels are minimized by pleasant daily events. Ambert, supra note
77, at 801. In contrast, when stepchildren visit, quarrels stand out and bad
feelings simmer without the opportunity for healing. Id.
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The age of the child is another significant factor that influ-
ences the stepparent-stepchild relationship.80 Stepparents re-
port better relations with younger children.8' Older children
may challenge more aspects of remarried life because they tend
to have greater perceptiveness, more self-confidence, and more
resources for rebelling.8 2 Younger children, on the other hand,
are more accepting of the new family situation.8 3 Moreover, if
the remarriage occurs when the stepchild is young, there is
more time for a bond to form between the stepparent and
stepchild.8 4
3. Treatment of Stepfamilies in the Legal System
Legal circumstances of stepfamilies also may relate to the
quality of stepparent-stepchild relations.8 5 The legal system
generally treats stepparents and stepchildren differently from
first-married family members. 86 Laws regulating the rights and
obligations of biological family members typically are not ex-
tended to stepparents and stepchildren.8 7 Most intestate suc-
cession statutes, for example, do not permit stepfamily
members to inherit from each other.88 Similarly, a stepparent
80. Fine, supra note 51, at 56.
81. Hobart, Parent-Child Relations in Remarried Families, 8 J. FAMI. IS-
SUES 259, 274 (1987); cf. L. DUBERMAN, supra note 68, at 57-58 (finding that
younger children have better relations with stepmothers, but that age is not a
factor in relations with stepfathers).
82. Hobart, supra note 81, at 262.
83. Id.; see also Fuller, supra note 68, at 53 (stating that most researchers
agree that younger children generally make the best adjustment to
stepfamilies).
84. L. DUBERMAN, supra note 68, at 106 (arguing that, in general, the
more people interact with each other, the more they come to like each other).
85. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
86. Note, supra note 51, at 703.
87. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 918.
88. See id. at 919-20. Laws of inheritance illustrate "the peremptory man-
ner in which the legal system ignores stepfamilies." Id at 918. Under state
intestacy statutes, the terms "children" and "parents" have never been so
broadly defined as to include stepchildren and stepparents. Id at 920. Some
statutes expressly exclude stepfamily members from the definitions of "child"
and "parent." Id. Courts often impose the same limitation by interpreting the
terms "child" and "issue" to include only biological and adopted children.
Note, supra note 51, at 704; see, e.g., In re Paus' Estate (Meyers v. Fraser), 324
Ill. App. 58, 61-62, 57 N.E.2d 212, 213 (1944) (holding that the children of the
sister of deceased's stepfather are not heirs-at-law); In re Smith's Estate (Ben-
son v. Nicholson), 49 Wash. 2d 229, 232, 299 P.2d 550, 552 (1956) (interpreting
"children" to exclude stepchildren).
Mahoney argues that the exclusion of stepfamily members from rights of
inheritance is unfair and inconsistent with the purpose of the intestacy laws.
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is not entitled to gain custody or visitation privileges following
termination of the marriage.8 9 Nor does stepparent status in-
clude an obligation to support a stepchild upon divorce.90 Occa-
sionally, courts use the common law doctrine of "in loco
parentis" to extend legal rights and duties to stepfamily mem-
bers.91 Under this doctrine, a person who intentionally assumes
the responsibility of a biological parent can be treated as a par-
ent for certain purposes.92
One commentator argues that these legal rules may affect
relations between stepfamily members.93 The lack of clear
legal obligations between stepparents and stepchildren may
lessen their degree of commitment.94 Legal ambiguities also
Mahoney, supra note 4, at 918. In addition, Mahoney proposes an intestacy
law that would allow stepfamily members to inherit from each other as "par-
ents" and "children" in certain circumstances. Her proposal permits inheri-
tance between stepparents and stepchildren when the remarriage is during the
child's minority, an "in loco parentis" relationship exists during the child's mi-
nority, and family ties continue thereafter. Id. at 936.
89. Fine, supra note 51, at 55. Many state statutes authorize custody or-
ders for "children of the marriage" in dissolution proceedings. Id at 54. The
statutes generally do not consider stepchildren as "children of the marriage,"
and thereby block stepparents' claims to custody under divorce and dissolution
statutes. See id. (citing Mahoney, supra note 18, at 63-65). Courts often up-
hold this strict interpretation of divorce laws. See, e.g., Morrow v. Morrow, 165
Conn. 665, 668-69, 345 A.2d 561, 562-63 (1974) (interpreting "children of mar-
riage" to exclude stepchildren); Palmer v. Palmer, 42 Wash. 2d 715, 717, 258
P.2d 475, 476 (1953) (same). Some courts grant custody and visitation rights to
a stepparent in the "best interests of the child," but not because of any legal
rights of the stepparent. Note, supra note 51, at 711.
Recently, however, courts have granted visitation rights to stepparents
who act "in loco parentis." Fine, supra note 51, at 54; see, e.g., Carter v.
Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (holding that a stepchild is a "child
of marriage" when the stepparent acts "in loco parentis"); Perry v. Superior
Ct., 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 486, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586-87 (1980) (Hopper, J., con-
curring) (suggesting that a stepchild becomes a "child of marriage" when the
stepparent acts "in loco parentis").
90. See supra note 51 (discussing child support fiom a stepparent upon
termination of the remarriage).
91. See supra notes 51, 89 (citing cases in which courts implement "in loco
parentis").
92. See supra note 51 (discussing "in loco parentis" status). "In loco
parentis" implies that the stepparent both assumes the parental status and dis-
charges parental duties. Id (citing Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d
683, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947)). If an "in loco parentis"
relationship exists, a stepparent assumes the same financial responsibilities to
the child as those possessed by a biological parent. Fine, supra note 51, at 54.
93. Fine, supra note 51, at 55.
94. Id. The quality of stepparent-stepchild relationships is tied to the de-
gree of commitment of the family members. Ida The law generally requires
only temporary commitments in stepfamilies. I& Awareness of the temporary
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perpetuate the uncertain status of stepfamilies in society and
may exacerbate adjustment difficulties for family members.9 5
II. THE REVISED U.P.C. INTESTACY PROVISIONS
The 1990 revision of the U.P.C. gives the surviving spouse a
greater share of the intestate estate in more situations than the
current Code.96 The minimum spousal share in any situation is
the first $150,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate.97
The revised U.P.C. gives the surviving spouse the entire estate
if the decedent has no surviving issue.9 8 The parents of the de-
cedent, therefore, do not share in the estate assets with the sur-
viving spouse. The spouse also receives the entire estate when
all of the decedent's surviving children are issue of the surviv-
ing spouse and the surviving spouse does not have children
nature of this relationship may lessen the quality of stepparent-stepchild inter-
actions. Id.
95. Id. Social science studies show that "role and boundary ambiguity"
may translate into adjustment problems for stepfamilies. 1d. (citing Giles-
Sims, The Stepparent Role: Expectations, Behavior, and Sanctions, 5 J. FAM.
ISSUEs 116, 117 (1984); Pasley, Family Boundary Ambiguity: Perceptions of
Adult Stepfamily Members, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT
RESEARCH AND THEORY 206, 206-07 (1987)). These terms refer to the lack of
clearly defined norms and guidelines relating to stepfamily relations. Id.
Legal inconsistencies and discrepancies concerning the treatment of stepfami-
lies may increase uncertainties in stepfamily households. Id Professor Fine
also argues that the absence of a legal obligation to support stepchildren may
produce family disharmony and create stressful conditions for children. Id.
96. Section 2-102. Share of Spouse. The intestate share of the dece-
dent's surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if-
(i) no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also de-
scendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of
the surviving spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) in other cases, the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any bal-
ance of the intestate estate.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1989).
97. See id. Under the current Code, the minimum spousal share is one-
half of the intestate estate. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (1983), quoted at
supra note 9.
98. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(i) (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra
note 96. This provision matches the allocation that a majority of property
owners prefer. Surveys show that most persons feel a primary responsibility
to their spouse and that a 100% distribution to the surviving spouse is the pre-
ferred distributive scheme when no issue survive the decedent. See supra note
40 and accompanying text. The current Code's pattern of dividing property be-
tween the spouse and parents is obsolete. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra
note 7, at 354-55 (concluding that the U.P.C.'s fixed dollar distribution pattern
does not conform to the stated preferences of the citizenry).
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from an earlier marriage. 99 In all other cases, the surviving
spouse takes the first $150,000 plus one-half of the
remainder. 00
The revised U.P.C. treats a surviving spouse who is a step-
parent more generously than the current Code.101 The revi-
sion, however, makes two distinctions based on stepfamily
status. The statute continues to decrease the spousal share
when the spouse is a stepparent of the decedent's surviving is-
sue.I 02 The revision also introduces a new distinction between
stepfamilies and first-married families by reducing the spousal
share when the surviving spouse who is the biological parent of
all the decedent's surviving children also has a child from an
earlier marriage. 0 3 Thus, the revised U.P.C. apparently as-
99. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra
note 96. The revision's provision for 100% distribution to the spouse in prefer-
ence to children who are issue of both the decedent and the surviving spouse is
more responsive to dispositive preferences than the approach taken in the cur-
rent Code. Surveys indicate that most people want their spouse to inherit the
entire estate when issue who are biological children of the decedent and the
surviving spouse survive. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Because
the current Code provides only a guaranteed minimum dollar amount in this
situation, it does not conform to the preferences of most people.
100. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(2) (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra
note 96. The revised U.P.C. triples the lump-sum amount from $50,000 to
$150,000. Presumably, the drafters intended to provide for the increase in the
cost of living since the Commissioners promulgated the current Code in 1969.
W. Waggoner, Wills, supra note 12, at 2-17.
101. The minimum spousal share that a stepparent receives under the re-
vised code is $150,000 plus one-half of the balance of the estate. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra note 96. The cur-
rent Code, however, gives a surviving spouse who is a stepparent only one-half
of the intestate estate. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4) (1983), quoted at supra
note 9.
102. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at
supra note 96 (providing that the surviving spouse receives the entire estate if
"all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviv-
ing spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who sur-
vives the decedent").
103. See id. The current Code treats a surviving spouse who is the biologi-
cal parent of all of the decedent's surviving children but who has a child from
a former marriage the same as a surviving spouse who is the biological parent
of all of the decedent's surviving children but who does not have a child from
a former marriage. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(3), quoted at supra note 9.
In both situations, the surviving spouse receives the first $50,000 plus one-half
of the remainder. Id. In contrast, the revised U.P.C. gives a surviving spouse
who has a child from an earlier marriage a less generous share of the estate
than a surviving spouse without a child from an earlier marriage. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra note 96. The for-
mer spouse receives the first $150,000 plus one-half of the balance, while the
latter receives the entire estate. Id.
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sumes that when both a stepchild and a biological child survive
the decedent, the decedent would want to favor a biological
child over a stepchild.10 4
The revised U.P.C., following current Code policy, distin-
guishes between a spouse who is the biological parent of surviv-
ing issue and a spouse who is the stepparent of surviving issue.
A surviving spouse who is the biological parent of all of the de-
cedent's surviving children and has no children from a previous
marriage receives the entire intestate estate.10 5 A surviving
spouse who is not the biological parent of one or more of the
decedent's surviving children, however, receives only the first
$150,000 of the estate assets and splits the remainder with the
decedent's biological children- 0 6 Thus, the stepparent receives
a fixed-share-plus-a-fraction of the estate under the revised
U.P.C. Although limited, the revised U.P.C. provides a more
generous stepparent share than the current Code. Under the
current Code, the stepparent must split the intestate estate
with the decedent's children without the surviving spouse re-
ceiving an initial fixed sum.10 7
The revised U.P.C. creates a distinction not present in the
current Code. A surviving spouse who is the biological parent
of all the decedent's children, but who has issue from a previ-
ous marriage, receives less of the intestate estate than a spouse
who is the biological parent of all of the decedent's issue and
does not have children from a previous marriage. 08 Thus,
when a stepchild and a biological child both survive the dece-
dent, the spousal share decreases from the entire estate to only
the first $150,000 plus one-half of the remainder.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE REVISED U.P.C. SPOUSAL
SHARE PROVISION
The revised U.P.C. makes important changes in the surviv-
104. The distinction produces a result whereby the biological child and the
stepchild receive unequal shares of the decedent's estate. When the decedent's
biological child and stepchild survive the decedent, the revised Code employs
the fixed sum distribution scheme. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (1)(ii) (Pro-
posed Draft 1989), quoted at supra note 96. The spouse receives the first
$150,000 of the estate and the decedent's issue share in the balance. Thus, for
estates of more than $150,000, a biological child of the decedent receives a
share of the assets while a stepchild does not.
105. See id.
106. See id. § 2-102(2).
107. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(4) (1983), quoted at supra note 9.
108. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at
supra note 96.
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ing spouse's share of the decedent's estate, but the proposal suf-
fers from its peremptory treatment of stepfamilies. By making
distinctions based solely on stepfamily status, the intestacy stat-
ute fails to meet the needs of growing numbers of remarried
couples. Furthermore, the revision's differential treatment of
stepfamilies perpetuates the societal bias against stepfamily
members and ignores the variability of remarriage situations 0 9
The revised U.P.C. provision reducing the spousal share
when both the decedent's stepchild and biological child survive
the decedent assumes that the decedent would want to favor
the biological child over the stepchild.110 Demographics, how-
ever, suggest that a decedent would desire to treat the children
equally.11 ' The surviving spouse more likely will be a widow
than a widower" m and a widow with a child from an earlier
marriage probably had physical custody of that child during the
remarriage.11 3 The decedent, therefore, would have had an op-
portunity to develop a close relationship with the stepchild. In
these circumstances, the decedent would be likely to treat the
stepchild and biological child equally.114 In addition, children
who have "half-siblings" 115 typically do not regard them as
"half-siblings.' 16 Rather, children tend to consider half-sib-
lings the same as siblings in first-married families.1 1 7
109. Intestacy statutes have the greatest impact on persons with moderate-
sized estates. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 337. Thus, the U.P.C.
provision limiting the spousal share to $150,000 plus one-half of the balance
may have little practical effect as a limitation because many intestate estates
may not exceed $150,000 in value. The probability, however, that most surviv-
ing spouses who are stepparents will receive the entire estate despite the limi-
tation does not justify retaining the limitation. The provision should be
eliminated because it perpetuates negative societal views of stepfamily mem-
bers and does not reflect the desires of many remarried persons.
110. See supra note 104; see also UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 1 introduc-
tory comment (stating that "[t]he Code attempts to reflect the normal desire
of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his property at death").
111. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
112. Widowhood is five times more likely for women than men. Nuckols,
Widowhood, Income Maintenance, and Economic Well-Being, MARRIAGE &
FAM. REV., Fall 1982, at 40.
113. See Ihinger-Tallman, supra note 4, at 28 (stating that 90% of divorce
decisions award custody to the mother).
114. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
115. Half-siblings are siblings who share one biological parent.
116. Ganong & Coleman, Do Mutual Children Cement Bonds in Stepfami-
lies?, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAm. 687, 696 (1988). Researchers found that 82% of
adults indicate that their older children did not distinguish between siblings
and half-siblings (children of the remarriage). Id. From the child's perspec-
tive, half-siblings were no different than siblings in first-married families. Id.
117. Id,
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Furthermore, the U.P.C.'s unequal treatment of a stepchild
and a biological child sends the legal message that the stepchild
is the more marginal child. Although demographics suggest
otherwise, the Code presumes that the stepchild was less im-
portant to the decedent than the biological child. The provision
does not recognize the likelihood that a close relationship de-
veloped between the decedent and the stepchild. The statute
thus perpetuates negative societal views of stepfamily
members.118
The revised U.P.C. gives a surviving stepparent of surviv-
ing issue a more generous share of the intestate estate than the
current Code, but continues to treat a stepparent of surviving
issue differently than a biological parent.119 This disparate
treatment of stepparents apparently reflects the greater risk
that a stepparent will disinherit the decedent's children. 2 0
This concern probably is justified in some stepfamily house-
holds,' 1' yet social science studies show that many stepfamily
members form bonds with each other.122 A stepparent and
stepchild may form a family bond and thus become the natural
objects of each other's bounty.123 In such situations, the likeli-
hood of disinheritance does not seem greater than in a first-
married family context. The U.P.C.'s spousal share provision,
however, does not recognize that stepfamily relationships often
are as meaningful as relationships in first-married families.12 4
118. See generally M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 311
(1989) (recognizing that "[a] country's law ... both affects and is affected by
the culture in which it arises").
119. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (Proposed Draft 1989), quoted at supra
note 96,
120. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 365.
121. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 929 (stating that the possibility of no
genuine family ties is greater in stepfamilies than in first-married families).
For example, the likelihood of important family ties developing between a
stepparent and stepchild is minimal when the child is an adult at the time of
the remarriage. Id. at 930. A stepfamily relationship also is less likely to de-
velop when the stepchild lives outside of the remarriage home. See supra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text. The stepparent may not desire to devise
property to the stepchild when the stepparent and stepchild have not formed
family ties.
122. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
123. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 949. The "natural object of the testator's
bounty" includes anyone who would take in the absence of a will under state
intestacy statutes. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 925 (5th ed. 1979). In designat-
ing heirs, the law generally looks to the decedent's close relationships. Id.
124. Whenever special bonds develop between stepfamily members, prop-
erty owners may make wills to protect their stepfamilies in the future. An in-
testacy statute, however, should not assume that stepfamily members will die
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The revised U.P.C.'s spousal share provision contravenes
current trends in statutory and case law. California recently
amended its intestate succession law to permit stepfamily mem-
bers to inherit from each other whenever a relationship devel-
oped between a child and a foster parent or stepparent. 25 The
California legislature also amended its Probate Code to include
stepchildren in class gift designations when a parent-child rela-
tionship exists.126 Moreover, courts increasingly use the doc-
trine of "in loco parentis" to extend legal aspects of the
biological parent-child relationship to the stepfamily context.127
Visitation cases, in which judges have held that stepparents
who act "in loco parentis" acquire visitation rights with
stepchildren, reflect this trend. 28 Thus, the revised spousal
share provision is contrary to the growing legal recognition that
stepfamilies can develop important relationships.
The less generous treatment of stepparents under the re-
vised U.P.C. reflects a societal bias against stepfamily situa-
tions.129  The U.P.C. provision for surviving spouses in
remarriage cases should match the dispositive wishes of remar-
ried property owners. 30 Stepfamily members are more con-
testate. Such an assumption puts a burden on stepfamilies to make wills,
while allowing first-married families to rely on intestacy schemes. Moreover,
intestacy laws should provide an estate plan that approximates the property
distribution a decedent would have made in a will. See supra note 34 and ac-
companying text. Intestate succession statutes, therefore, should accommodate
the desires of remarried couples who would want to benefit stepfamily mem-
bers in a testamentary disposition.
125. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408(b) (West Supp. 1990). A parent-child re-
lationship exists between a stepparent and a stepchild if the relationship de-
veloped during the child's minority and continued throughout the parties'
lifetimes. See also supra note 56 (discussing changes to § 6408(b) of the Cali-
fornia Probate Code).
126. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6152(b); see also supra note 56 (discussing
changes to § 6152(b) of the California Probate Code). A class gift is any "gift
of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at time of gift,
to be ascertained at a future time, who are all to take in equal, or other defi-
nite proportions, the share of each being dependent for its amount upon the
ultimate number." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (5th ed. 1979). A gift to
"A's children" is a class gift. Under the California Probate Code, a stepchild of
'A' is included in the class gift if a parent-child relationship is established be-
tween 'A' and the stepchild.
127. See Note, supra note 51, at 712-14 (discussing recent cases in which
courts have held that stepparents acting "in loco parentis" acquire visitation
rights).
128. Icd
129. See supra notes 59-67, 118 and accompanying text (discussing society's
negative views of stepfamilies).
130. The U.P.C. "attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of
wealth as to disposition of his property at death." UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt.
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scious of the challenges in multiple marriage situations.13
Because remarried property owners are likely to be aware that
many factors affect the development of stepfamily relation-
ships, the U.P.C. must recognize this variability. Intestate pro-
visions for a surviving stepparent should be based on the
stepparent-stepchild relationship, not on stepfamily status
itself.132
IV. TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPT OF FAMILY
A. A MORE RESPONSIVE INTESTACY LAW
The spousal share provision of the revised U.P.C. remains
premised on the traditional first-married family model. In
stepfamily situations, the surviving spouse's share is reduced re-
gardless of whether stepfamily members developed close rela-
tionships. Intestacy law should broaden its concept of family to
treat stepfamilies as first-married families whenever family ties
are likely to have developed. The following Model Spousal
Share Amendment recognizes important stepfamily relation-
ships and better responds to the needs of remarried property
owners.
B. A MODEL AMENDMENT TO THE U.P.C133
A Bill
To amend section 2-102 of the revised U.P.C. (U.P.C. § 2-
102 (Proposed Draft 1989)), relating to the intestate share of a
decedent's surviving spouse.
1 introductory comment (1983). Thus, the property distribution scheme for re-
married persons should match the preferences of remarried couples.
131. See supra note 60. Professor Fine found that members of single-par-
ent and stepparent families had less stereotypical views of stepmothers than
students from first-married homes. Fine, supra note 1, at 537.
132. See Fine, supra note 51, at 55 (suggesting that the rights and obliga-
tions of stepfanily members should be based upon the actual nature of their
relationships). A complete reversal whereby all stepparents would be treated
as biological parents would be too sweeping. Mahoney, supra note 4, at 929.
When no stepfamily ties have developed, the decedent likely would want to
give some property outright to his or her issue to ensure that the stepparent
does not disinherit the children. The fear that no genuine family ties have de-
veloped is justified in some stepfamily cases, and in such situations, the step-
parent may prefer not to benefit the child in a testamentary disposition. See
supra note 121 (discussing circumstances under which a parent-child relation-
ship between stepfamily members is unlikely to form). Therefore, a provision
that reflects the quality of the stepparent-stepchild relationship is desirable.
133. This Note refers to the Model Statute as the Proposed Model
Amendment.
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Share of Spouse. The intestate share of the decedent's surviving
spouse is:
(1) the entire estate if:
(i) no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants also are de-
scendants of the surviving spouse; or
(iii) one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants
are not descendants of the surviving spouse and all such descendants
either are adults or are minors who have been living as a regular
member of the household of the surviving spouse for a minimum of
two years.
(2) in all other cases, the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any
balance of the intestate estate.
C. ADVANTAGES OF THE MODEL AMENDMENT
The proposed Model Spousal Share Amendment responds
to the variability of remarriage situations. The amendment
makes two desirable reforms to the revised U.P.C. One reform
gives the entire estate to the surviving spouse when both a
stepchild and a biological child survive the decedent.134 A sec-
ond reform treats a spouse who is a stepparent the same as a
biological parent whenever it is likely that a stepparent-
stepchild relationship has developed.135 The model provision
adopts the two-year living-together requirement as a conve-
nient and workable measure of the quality of the stepparent-
stepchild relationship. 136
The first reform eliminates the revised U.P.C.'s distinction
between a surviving spouse who is the biological parent of all
the decedent's issue, but who has children from a previous mar-
riage, and a surviving spouse who is the biological parent of all
the decedent's issue, but who does not have children from a
previous marriage. 37 The proposed amendment allows a sur-
viving spouse who is the biological parent of all the decedent's
134. See Proposed Model Amendment § 2-102(I)(ii), (iii), printed at supra
Part IV. B.
135. See Proposed Model Amendment § 2-102(1)(iii), printed at supra Part
IV. B.
136. An intestacy statute must deal with diverse situations in a relatively
simple fashion. See Schneider, supra note 36, at 420-22. An attempt to adopt
the "in loco parentis" doctrine and make property distributions on a case-by-
case basis would be contrary to the desired simplicity of intestate succession.
The two-year living-together requirement in the Proposed Model Amendment
thus serves as a workable substitute for a test of the quality of the stepparent-
stepchild relationship.
137. Compare Proposed Model Amendment § 2-102, printed at supra Part
IV. B. (eliminating distinction) with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (Proposed
Draft 1989), quoted at supra note 96 (maintaining distinction).
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issue to inherit the entire estate, regardless of whether the
spouse has children from an earlier marriage. Thus, neither
the stepchild nor the biological child of the decedent would
share in the intestate estate. This reform is superior to the re-
vised U.P.C. because it matches the probable desire of the dece-
dent, who likely would not want to favor one child over the
other.35 Furthermore, the amendment eliminates negative
stereotyping by treating the stepchild and the biological child
equally.
The second reform allows a spouse who is a stepparent of
surviving issue to be treated as a biological parent based on the
child's age and the length of the child's relationship and resi-
dence with the stepparent.139 Social science studies show that
these factors are indicative of the quality of the stepparent-
stepchild relationship.140 By incorporating these factors, the
amendment is responsive to the variability of stepfamily rela-
tions, while retaining the desired simplicity of intestacy laws.141
The proposed amendment allows a surviving spouse who is
a stepparent to receive the entire intestate estate if the dece-
dent's surviving child either is an adult or a minor who has
been living in the remarriage home with the stepparent for a
minimum of two years. 42 This distributive pattern ensures
138. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (showing that
demographics indicate that the decedent would want to treat the children
equally). If the surviving spouse has a minor child from a former marriage
who did not reside in the remarriage household, the decedent may not want to
treat the biological child and the stepchild equally. In such situations, the de-
cedent was less likely to have developed a relationship with the stepchild. See
supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Thus, the decedent may wish to
give a portion of the estate outright to the biological child and thereby favor
the biological child over the stepchild. The proposed amendment could incor-
porate a provision providing that if the surviving spouse has a minor child
from a former marriage, the surviving spouse receives the entire estate only if
that minor child lived in the remarriage home for a minimum of two years.
The proposed amendment does not contain such a provision to preserve the
desired simplicity of intestacy laws. See supra note 136.
139. See Proposed Model Amendment § 2-102(1)(iii), printed at supra Part
IV. B.
140. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 136.
142. See Proposed Model Amendment § 2-102(1)(iii), printed at supra Part
IV. B. The proposed amendment does not require a surviving spouse and a mi-
nor stepchild to continue to reside together following administration of the es-
tate. In some cases, the decedent's former spouse or blood relatives may seek
custody of the surviving minor child. If the former spouse or relatives obtain
custody and the stepparent and child thereby cease to reside together, the de-
cedent may wish to give the child a share of the estate because the stepparent
would less likely use estate assets for the child's support. An intestacy statute
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self-sufficiency of the spouse and serves the best interests of
both the spouse and child. An adult child is likely to be finan-
cially self-sufficient and less in need of the estate assets than
the surviving spouse.143 The spouse, however, probably was fi-
nancially interdependent with the decedent'" and may be at an
age at which new income opportunities are reduced. 45 Thus,
the spouse seems to have a more deserving claim to the estate
assets than an adult child and the decedent more likely would
have intended to provide for the spouse.146
When a minor child survives the decedent, the amendment
treats a stepparent as a biological parent only when it is likely
that stepfamily members developed close relationships. When
a minor stepchild has lived with the stepparent for at least two
years, the stepparent and stepchild often have formed ties
much like those in a first-married family.147 In this situation,
arguments for treating a stepparent differently than a biologi-
cal parent are unconvincing. Risk that the stepparent will not
provide for the child seems no greater than in the first-married
family context. Similarly, the argument that the .stepparent
will divert the decedent's property and not pass the estate as-
sets on to the stepchild is not compelling when the stepparent
and stepchild have established a relationship with one another.
Having addressed these arguments, distribution of 100 per-
cent of the estate to the spouse best serves the needs of both
could contain a requirement that the surviving spouse and the minor child
continue to live together after the decedent's death, to ensure that a portion of
the estate assets go toward the child's support. The proposed amendment does
not contain such a requirement, for reasons of simplicity and ease of
administration.
143. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 367. Because adult children
are likely to be self-supporting at the decedent's death, a delay in inheritance
or even permanent disinheritance does not warrant depleting the financial re-
sources of the spouse, who probably was financially interdependent with the
decedent. Id. at 355-56.
144. Although many married women work outside the home, the husband
usually is still the principal wage earner. Nuckols, supra note 112, at 39. In a
1970 study of widows, researchers found that approximately two years follow-
ing the husband's death, the average income of families headed by a widow
was 56% of the family income before the husband's death. Id. at 50. Thirty
percent of widows reported a "slight" decline in their living standards and 20%
said their living standards were "much lower." Id. at 51.
145. Comment, Iowa Study, supra note 37, at 1082. In 1979, the median age
of widowers was 71.4 years and of widows, 70.5 years. Nuckols, supra note 112,
at 40. Sixty-nine percent of widowers and 68% of widows were 65 years of age
or older. Id
146. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 367.
147. See supra note 78.
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the spouse and minor child. Generally, a minor child is better
protected if the spouse receives the funds.148 Distributing prop-
erty to minors requires expensive and cumbersome guardian-
ship proceedings.149 Allocation of the estate assets to the
spouse eliminates these expenses and thus provides more funds
for the child.'50
No intestacy scheme can hope to address all the various re-
marriage situations.15' Yet the U.P.C. fails to recognize any va-
riability in remarriage cases. The proposed reform recognizes
the importance of stepfamily ties whenever stepfamily mem-
bers probably developed close relationships. Thus, the pro-
posed Model Amendment identifies cases in which a remarried
decedent would want to treat the surviving stepparent as a bio-
logical parent. In addition, the reform may reduce negative
stereotypes that can adversely affect stepfamily members. 5 2
CONCLUSION
Intestacy laws are designed to reflect the dispository
148. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 7, at 356.
149. 1d Attorneys generally advise clients to devise the entire estate to
their spouses in preference to children to avoid complicated guardianship pro-
ceedings. Id at 360.
150. Id at 356.
151. Id at 367. The proposed amendment may not achieve the best solu-
tion in all cases. For example, consider a situation in which Husband A mar-
ries Wife A and then Husband A dies intestate. Wife A receives all Husband
A's property to the exclusion of Husband A's blood relatives. Wife A later re-
marries Husband B. If Wife A then also dies intestate, Husband B will receive
Husband A's property. Husband A probably would have preferred that his
property return to his family of orientation.
Consider a similar situation in which Husband A dies intestate, leaving
Wife A and two surviving children of their marriage. Wife A again receives all
of Husband A's property in preference to the children. Wife A remarries Hus-
band B. If Wife A then dies intestate and her children from her former mar-
riage are adults, Husband B will receive Husband A's property to the
exclusion of the children. Again, Husband A probably would have wanted his
property to go to his children rather than Husband B.
Lastly, assume once more that Husband A dies intestate, leaving Wife A
and two surviving children of their marriage. Wife A remarries Husband B
when her children are adults. Husband B then dies intestate, survived by Wife
A and his stepchildren, with whom he has not developed a close relationship.
Wife A inherits Husband B's property. If Wife A then also dies intestate, Hus-
band B's property will go to his stepchildren. Because Husband B had not es-
tablished a relationship with those children, he might have preferred that his
property return to his family of orientation.
152. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing negative soci-
etal views of stepfamilies); see also M. GLENDON, supra note 118, at 311 (stating
that the law can affect societal attitudes).
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wishes of persons who die without wills. The current U.P.C.
spousal share provision, however, fails to approximate the
desires of persons in stepfamily situations regarding distribu-
tion to the surviving spouse. The newly revised U.P.C. spousal
share provision makes improvements in the surviving spouse's
share of the estate, but the revision does not match the desires
of remarried couples, who often want to benefit surviving
steprelatives in a testamentary disposition.
Reforms are necessary to make the U.P.C. more responsive
to the needs and wishes of increasing numbers of remarried
couples. The revised provision, which reduces the spousal
share when a stepchild and a biological child survive the dece-
dent, should be eliminated. Furthermore, the U.P.C.'s differen-
tial treatment of all spouses who are stepparents ignores the
variability in remarriage situations. A spouse who is a steppar-
ent should receive the entire intestate estate when the surviv-
ing stepchild is an adult or a minor who has been living in the
remarriage home with the stepparent for a minimum of two
years. Adoption of these reforms in the revised U.P.C. would
produce an intestacy scheme that recognizes the importance of
stepfamily relationships and reflects the needs and desires of
remarried property owners.
Carolyn R. Glick

